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I. INTRODUCTION
Santa Clara University's Law Clinic was established over twenty-
five years ago. From January 1995 through May 1996, we experi-
mented with a fee-generating model at the Clinic1 which consisted of
an employment law project operating in conjunction with the criminal
defense clinic already in place. Our results exceeded our expectations
and offer an encouraging new model for a clinical program that can
* Patricia Pierce is a partner in the law firm of Wilig, Williams & Davidson of Philadel-
phia. Kathleen Ridolfi is an Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School
of Law. The authors wish to thank Madeleine Randal for her invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1 Prior to January, 1995, the Santa Clara University Law Clinic had two full-time ten-
ured or tenure track teaching positions handling 13 students in a semester.
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generate substantial fees without compromising the goals and values
of clinical educators.
In recent years a lively and often heated debate has arisen in
clinical scholarship about the feasibility and utility of implementing
fee-generating legal clinics.2 This debate has been fueled by publica-
tion of the Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profes-
sion: Narrowing the Gap (MacCrate Report), a 1992 study done by
the American Bar Association. 3 The MacCrate Report stressed the
concern that the curricula offered in most American law schools do
not adequately prepare students for the practice of law. Specifically,
the report emphasizes that law graduates lack the skills and values
needed to practice law.
The MacCrate Report is only the most recent acknowledgement
of the serious gap that exists between the theory taught in law schools
and the practice skills needed in the real-world representation of cli-
ents.4 As one commentator observed: "Many law teachers - especially
clinicians - agree with the main message of the MacCrate report; the
question is what to do and how to pay for it."5 To the extent that
clinicians have taken issue with the MacCrate Report, it is because it
offers no suggestions for funding the expensive training it mandates. 6
Proponents of the fee-generating clinic argue that it is the only
2 See, e.g. Richard A. Matasar, The MacCrate Report from the Dean's Perspective, 1
CLIN. L. REV. 457 (1994); Gary Laser, Significant Curricular Developments: The MacCrate
Report and Beyond, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 425 (1994); Martin Guggenheim, Fee-Generating Clin-
ics: Can We Bear The Costs?, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 677 (1995); Lisa Lerman, Fee-For-Service
Clinical Teaching: Slipping Toward Commercialism, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 685 (1995).
By fee-generating clinics we mean those that produce fees substantial enough to de-
fray significant costs of the program. This type of fee-generating program is distinguished
from the type that had previously been in place at Santa Clara. In the earlier program
clients paid minimal fees ($200-300 a case), and the total income in any given year was not
significant enough to have real impact on the funding of the program.
3 TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS To THE
BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM 235 (1992), [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. The Task Force that issued the
MACCRATE REPORT was created by the American Bar Association Section of Legal Edu-
cation and Admissions to the Bar "to look at public and professional expectations of what
lawyers are and ought to be, and what skills and values they need to fulfill those expecta-
tions, and how they go about acquiring those skills and values during and after law school."
Press Release, American Bar Association Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession
(August 9, 1992).
4 This controversy is not new. For an early and well-known critique of the "modem"
casebook methodology of Christopher Columbus Landell, see Jerome Frank's Why Not A
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). See also Jerome Frank, Both
Ends Against The Middle, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 20 (1951).
5 Lerman, supra note 2, at 685.
6 See John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993).
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model that allows an intensive clinical experience to a large number of
law students, given the high cost of clinical education. 7 Opponents of
the model contend that its "superficial appeal" masks dangerous
threats to the educational mission of clinical educators, specifically,
that fee-generating clinics: 1) undermine the educational goals of
clinical education, 2) compromise clinic education's traditional com-
mitment to public-interest lawyering, and 3) lower the academic
standing of the individual clinician.8 Additional criticisms include
concerns that case demands and pressures minimize the ability of cli-
nicians to pursue scholarship,9 pose a risk that client billing will be-
come unwieldy and imprecise, 10 force clinicians to select cases from a
profit rather than pedagogical perspective," raise ethical issues by
"using unpaid student labor to raise money,"'1 2 and alienate the pri-
vate bar by siphoning off clients.' 3 While these critics have taken aim
at the fee-generating model, they have failed to offer concrete sugges-
tions as to how the mandates of the MacCrate Report might be ac-
complished for the largest number of law students.
Until now, opponents of the fee-generating model have targeted
one program - that developed and championed by Gary Laser and
Richard Matasar at the Chicago-Kent School of Law. Undeniably, the
Chicago-Kent program has been economically sound and has grown
significantly over a relatively short period of time.14 Criticism of the
Chicago-Kent program centers on the requirement that clinicians gen-
erate their own salaries and the concern that any economic benefit to
law schools of fee-generating programs will come at too great a cost to
the student, client, clinician, and private bar.
In the planning stages of our experimental program at Santa
Clara, we shared many of the concerns voiced by these critics. We
also had another concern: that students would not be able to provide
competent representation in the complex area of employment litiga-
tion. In fact, none of the problems we had anticipated going into the
7 See, e.g., Matasar, supra note 2; Laser, supra note 2. See also MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 254 n.36 (citing data on costs of clinics and concluding that "[the] goal of
offering enrollment in a live client in-house clinic to every student before he or she gradu-
ates may not be feasible from a budgetary perspective for some time").
8 Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 681-82.
9 Lerman, supra note 2, at 690.
10 Id. at 700-02.
11 Id. at 696-97.
12 Id. at 704-05.
13 Id. at 705-06.
14 The areas covered by clinicians at the Chicago-Kent program include employment
discrimination, civil litigation, domestic and international commercial litigation, federal tax
litigation, real estate transactions, criminal defense litigation, immigration, and health law.
Laser, supra note 2, at 438.
Spring 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 441 1996-1997
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
program ever materialized. For example, to our surprise we found the
private bar, and in particular alumnae, extremely supportive and en-
couraging. We also found that client billing in the lucrative employ-
ment cases was no more complicated than the billing practices that
had been in place for years at Santa Clara Law Clinic, where modest
fees have always been charged for legal work. Likewise, issues sur-
rounding the use of "unpaid student labor" in employment cases were
much the same as they are in the less lucrative criminal cases. On this
issues, we simply disagree with the critics who suspect that the use of
"unpaid student labor" is unethical.
Regarding the other concerns stressed, it is important to note two
key differences between Santa Clara's program and that at Chicago-
Kent: 1) unlike the Chicago-Kent program, at Santa Clara the clini-
cian's salary is not dependent on fees generated,15 2) the Santa Clara
program has two distinct components - an employment project and a
criminal misdemeanor project. As explained in this article, these dif-
ferences were key factors in the success of our program.
After two years of operation, we found that the fees generated by
the cases had little or no bearing on the educational mission of our
program. Also, because of the abundance of cases available to us, we
did not find ourselves in the difficult position of having to choose
cases based on monetary concerns rather than pedagogical interests.
The cases we litigated were educationally sound and financially lucra-
tive. Further, because our salaries were not dependent on the money
we earned, our status among our colleagues was not affected. To the
extent that the demands of cases placed added burdens on us, the fees
generated made it possible to hire fellows 16 to assist with the addi-
15 Since the inception of the law clinic at Santa Clara, clinician salaries have never been
dependent on fees generated by the program. The employment law project described here
evolved when a tenured member of the clinical faculty took a two-year leave and her posi-
tion was filled by one of the authors of this article, whose primary experience was in em-
ployment litigation. Her salary was paid by the law school, as any visitor's salary would be
and was not dependent on fees generated by the clinic.
In the Chicago-Kent model, clinical professors are currently being hired on long term
contracts that require them to bring in fees from their clinical cases which will generate
150% of salary. The additional 50% over and above the clinician's individual salary is cal-
culated to cover additional "overhead costs" (such as health benefits, secretarial, and pen-
sion) with the law school contributing only space, library resources, and malpractice
insurance. Monies generated in excess are shared between the clinician and the law school
according to a "graduated tax." Any clinician who fails to generate the requisite amount is
assessed a penalty, which must be paid back to the law school. These clinicians are not on
tenure track and, therefore, have no scholarship or community service responsibilities.
They participate "fully" in the governance of the law school, except decisions on hiring and
tenure. Gary Laser, supra note 2, at 438.
Although the Chicago-Kent program has taken center stage in these debates, it is not
the only fee-generating clinic operating in American law schools.
16 Santa Clara's fellowship program offers a one to two year position for recent law
. [Vol. 3:439
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tional work, freeing us up to pursue scholarship. Lastly, the combina-
tion of criminal cases (where we continued our on-going work
representing indigent defendants, battered women and people with
AIDS) and employment cases (where, as it turned out, we repre-
sented clients who might not otherwise have found competent repre-
sentation) allowed us to enhance the public interest work of Santa
Clara's Law Clinic, a goal that has long been central to this program.
In this article, we focus primarily on the employment rather than
the criminal component of the program. We did this because the criti-
cisms of fee-for-service clinics hinge on the demands of complex cases
that generate substantial fees, which is more characteristic of our em-
ployment cases than our criminal cases. The employment cases tend
to be more protracted than the criminal cases and, while the criminal
cases do generate modest fees, the employment cases demand a more
substantial contingency fee following successful resolution of the case.
Our emphasis on employment cases is an effort to address head-on
the concerns of our critics.
II. PEDAGOGICAL GOALS
The MacCrate Report outlines specific goals for legal education
as ten fundamental skills: problem solving, legal analysis and reason-
ing, legal research, fact investigation, communication, counseling, ne-
gotiation, litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures,
organization and management of legal work, and recognizing and
resolving ethical dilemmas; 17 and, four fundamental values: providing
competent representation, striving to improve the profession, profes-
sional development, and promoting justice, fairness, and morality.' 8
While there is general agreement among clinicians that these articu-
lated goals and values are germane to clinical teaching, clinical pro-
grams vary as to which skills and values are emphasized. 19 Our
experimental fee-for-service clinic attempted to embrace the pedagog-
ical goals and values outlined in the MacCrate Report and one addi-
tional goal: to earn enough money to make a significant contribution
to the cost of providing clinical legal education to our students. Since,
graduates interested in law teaching. The program targets law graduates traditionally un-
derrepresented in law teaching, providing financial and peer support. Fellows have the
opportunity to collaborate with experienced law teachers and are encouraged and sup-
ported in the publication of legal scholarship. A stated goal of the program is to advance
the public interest mission of the law school and as such, fellows have a natural place in
Santa Clara's Law Clinic.
17 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 138-40, 141-207.
18 Id. at 140-41, 207-21.
19 See, e.g., Homer C. LaRue, Developing an Identity of Responsible Lawyering through
Experiential Learning, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 1147 (1992).
Spring 19971
HeinOnline  -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 443 1996-1997
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
unlike other fee-generating models, we were not saddled with the bur-
den of having to raise our own salaries, we were not overly concerned
with the amount of money we would raise. In fact, the income we did
earn exceeded what we believed possible over so short a period of
time.
III. EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING THROUGH A
REFLECTIVE PRACTICUM
Much of learning theory supports the idea that adults learn best
through experiential learning.20 Consistent with this theory, role as-
sumption has always been a "defining feature of clinical education.121
Although traditional legal education has been almost exclusively theo-
retical, the goal of clinical legal education has been to "bridge the gap
between the theory of the classroom and the practice of the real
world."'22 Clinical legal education integrates abstract theory into ac-
tual legal problems. Through clinical education, students can learn
how the practitioner confronts a situation of uncertainty and unique-
ness, reflects on the issues presented, and solves real-life legal
problems. Clinical education prepares students to respond to the
challenges posed in practice where one is confronted with problems
that cannot be solved by the routine application of theory because
they do not present themselves as "well formed structures" to which
pure theory can be applied. 23 The competent practitioner is chal-
lenged to "construct" not only a solution but the problem itself.24
A challenge for clinical educators is to develop a reflective practi-
20 See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch, The Androgogical Basis of Clinical Education, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 321, 325 (1982).
21 Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 277, 283 (citing the Association of American Law Schools-American Bar Associa-
tion Committee On Guidelines For Clinical Legal Education, Guidelines For Clinical Legal
Education (1980) [hereinafter Guidelines] at 12, which defines clinical legal education as
follows:
'Clinical Legal Studies' includes law student performance on live cases or problems,
or in simulation of the lawyer's role, for the mastery of basic lawyering skills and the
better understanding of professional responsibility, substantive and procedural law,
and the theory of legal practice. The performance or simulation of the lawyer's role
may include one or more of the following: 1) representing or assisting in represent-
ing a client in judicial, administrative, executive, or legislative proceedings; 2) assist-
ing a client as office or house counsel; or 3) undertaking factual investigations,
empirical research, policy analysis, and legal analysis on behalf of a client.
Guidelines at 14.
22 Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 231,
247 (1995).
23 DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 3-4 (1987).
24 Id. Schbn observes that the problems of the real world often do not present them-
selves as problems at all, rather they appear as "messy, indeterminate situations" upon
which the practitioner must first impose order in order to find an appropriate solution.
[Vol. 3:439
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cum that examines what it is that competent professionals do when
solving problems in the "indeterminate zones of [legal] practice"
which are riddled with "uncertainty, uniqueness, and value conflict. 25
In his influential work on educating professionals, Donald Schon ar-
gues that a professional is, in essence, an artist and that artistry cannot
be taught, but that it can be coached. 26 Thus, central to this learning
theory is the notion that "artistry," as taught in the practicum, is a
collaborative process involving learning that occurs when the student
performs and reflects, when the coach critiques and demonstrates, and
when students learn from each other.27 The coach's role is seen as
"demonstrating, advising, questioning and criticizing. "28
The final step in a reflective practicum is a discussion of the pro-
cess that has just occurred and an articulation of what was done and
why. This "reflection on reflection-in-action" provides the model for
the future professional's critique of her own performance throughout
her professional life, and thus encourages continued professional
growth.
The general consensus among clinicians is that a primary goal of
clinical education should teach students to become "reflective practi-
tioners. ' 29 Critics argue that a reflective practicum is not possible in a
fee-for-service clinic. Our experience at Santa Clara refutes that con-
clusion. With our model, we were able to concentrate on teaching
students to become reflective practitioners in a clinic that generated
substantial fees.
IV. A FEE-FOR-SERVICE CLINIC AS A REFLECTIVE PRACTICUM
Consistent with the broad goals of the MacCrate Report, our aim
at Santa Clara was to create a reflective practicum emphasizing skills
theory and application,30 "reflection-in-action" (learning from doing)
and "reflection on reflection-in-action" (later thinking about what you
25 Id. at 6.
26 Id. at 17.
27 Id. at 38.
28 Id. at 38.
29 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 508, 513 (1992); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Education - A 21st Century Per-
spective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616 (1984); Michael Meltsner & Phillip G. Schrag, Scenes
From A Clinic, 127 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1978); William P. Quigley, Introduction to
Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AK-
RON L. REv. 463, 474 (1995).
30 We are using the term "skills theory" to emphasize that the dichotomy between "the-
ory" (as taught in traditional Langdellian classrooms) and "practice" is false. Every skill
practiced by lawyers is replete with theory, and the intern who learns only application
without theory has acquired knowledge that is already obsolete. See generally Mark Spie-
gel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 577 (1986).
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did to improve your performance in the future).3' Because our pro-
gram was a litigation clinic, students were also naturally confronted
with issues of role and professional identity, ethics, and "fact skepti-
cism."'32 A central objective of this reflective practicum was to expose
students to a wide range of experience. To this end, we assigned each
student to both criminal misdemeanor and employment cases.33 This
mix of cases provided the opportunity for students to assume full re-
sponsibility for some cases and to work collaboratively with a supervi-
sor on others. It offered students exposure to clients from a variety of
socio-economic backgrounds and provided opportunities for con-
fronting issues of diversity, service, and justice.
Our teaching methodologies were both directive and nondirec-
tive; we employed role assumption (live client and simulation), evalu-
ation, modeling, demonstration, and didactic and dialectical forms of
teaching.34 We utilized a combination of readings, lecture, demonstra-
31 The term "reflection-in-action" and "reflection on reflection-in-action" are addi-
tional terms coined by Donald A. Schon. Schon defines "reflection-in-action" as:
[a] process by which a new response is generated in the situation, in response to
surprise and under conditions of uncertainty, in a way that involves on-the-spot ex-
perimentation and that does not necessarily take place in words . . . reflection on
reflection-in-action is an attempt to describe the knowledge that was generated and
the conditions under which it was generated and on the on-the-spot experimentation
that was carried out. The two of these in combination ... are ... a major part of what
counts as artistry in practice.
Sch~n, Educating The Reflective Legal Practitioner, supra note 22, at 247.
32 The term "fact skepticism" has been defined as "the idea that the legal system is.
incapable of reconstructing the complexity of past events with enough accuracy to afford
certainty to decision makers or observers about what has occurred and what should occur."
Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal
Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 718 (1992).
33 Employment cases are complex and thus are ready targets for critics who believe
hard cases have no place in clinical programs. As we explain in this article, however, we
found employment cases very useful in the clinical setting. For a view that advocates tak-
ing tough cases to broaden student experience, to challenge the clinician, and to keep the
practice interesting, see Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical) Law, 2
CLIN. L. REv. 545 (1996). Reingold's "benchmark of the 'hardness' of.the case is the ex-
tent to which it: (1) poses the risk of taxing the program's resources; (2) may be controver-
sial either in the public eye or to some constituent group of the law school; (3) is likely to
outlive (figuratively if not literally) the students assigned to it; and (4) presents legal issues
of a scope, scale, character, or complexity not ordinarily handled by the program." Id. at
546-47.
34 This mix of methodologies has been explored by several authors. See Mina Kotkin,
Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. REv. 185 (1989); Hoff-
man, supra note 21. Hoffman explores in depth the various learning and teaching method-
ologies. For instance, he observes that role assumption, coupled with evaluative critique, is
particularly well-suited to teaching lawyering skills such as interviewing, negotiating, devel-
oping case strategy, and trial advocacy. Hoffman argues, however, that a combined method
of "demonstration, role assumption and evaluation is a far superior method of teaching
lawyering skills than reliance on any one method" because it is not only more efficient, it
also permits more "complete and in depth" exploration of the subject matter than is strictly
[Vol. 3:439
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tion, and simulation early in the semester so that students could be
oriented quickly and provided with a theoretical framework for later
tasks in role.35 As students became acclimated to their roles and the
substantive and procedural law applicable to the cases, they took on
increasing responsibility for planning and making difficult strategic
and tactical decisions.36
Students worked in teams on both criminal and employment
cases. A team of two students was given responsibility for each crimi-
nal case and, depending on the complexity and stage of the employ-
ment case, four to six students were assigned. Continuity was assured
by two methods: 1) memoranda detailing the progression of the case,
and 2) "senior associates" (students taking their second semester of
clinic) who acted as bridges for clients and helped orient new students
to the cases.
Both directive and non-directive teaching methods were used de-
pending on the difficulty of the task and the sophistication of the indi-
vidual student. Some clinicians advocate a purely non-directive
teaching methodology for even the most mundane tasks, arguing that
it is essential in the setting of the reflective practicum to permit learn-
ing through repeated trial and error.37 Others have questioned the
called for in a given situational problem. Id. at 286. Role assumption is less suited to
conveying comprehensive knowledge of broad subject matter because it is less organized
and too inefficient. Id. at 287. Many clinicians take issue with this approach and maintain
that the only acceptable methodology is strict role assumption coupled with nondirective
teaching. Compare Jane Aiken et al., The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD.
L. REv. 1047, 1073-75 (1985). In the Santa Clara project, we rejected a completely
nondirective approach for handling our employment caseload because of the sheer com-
plexity of this type of litigation.
35 "Skills training," particularly emphasizing interviewing and counseling skills, is intro-
duced early in the semester during a weekend "boot camp" which has long been a part of
Santa Clara's clinical program. During the remaining weeks of the semester, we covered
topics such as case theory and theme, negotiation, civil and criminal procedure, motion
practice, discovery, taking and defending depositions, and trial advocacy skills. Several
classes were used to refine case theory or strategy in cases we were actually working on or
to conduct simulations of actual hearings or depositions for which students were preparing.
At times we involved outside speakers, including members of our faculty, and we fre-
quently involved the clients themselves.
36 Peter Toll Hoffman has described this "staged supervision" concept in detail. See
Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages Of The Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 ATIoCH L. J.
301 (1986). At Santa Clara, we found that it was relatively easy to move through all three
stages in supervising student handling of misdemeanor cases, producing at the last stage a
supervisory relationship in which the student acts as lawyer and the coach acts merely as
"confirmer and guider." Id. at 309. The complexity and prolonged life of our employment
cases, however, precluded us from moving farther than stage two in which the intern and
supervisor engage in a collaborative effort. See id. at 307.
.37 See, e.g., Aiken et al., supra note 34, at 1073-1075. The authors recount a situation in
which interns had puzzled for eight weeks over a social security regulation that was prob-
lematic for their client's case. Even though the supervisors knew of another helpful regula-
tion, they refrained from sharing this information so that the students could experience the
Spring 19971
HeinOnline  -- 3 Clinical L. Rev. 447 1996-1997
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
pedagogical value of so rigid a methodology especially in the earliest
stages of clinical training.38
In her article critiquing fee-generating clinics, Lisa Lerman, a
strong advocate of non-directive teaching, offers an "illustration [of]
the quality of reflection that is possible in academic clinical teaching"
and argues that "fee-for-service clinical teaching offers significant disin-
centives to this type of teaching. " 39 One such illustration is of a typical
call to opposing counsel. She reports:
a phone call to opposing counsel asking for a week's delay in a hear-
ing date might be discussed at several case team meetings .... [T]he
case team might discuss whether the request should be made by tel-
ephone, letter, mailgram or personal contact; who should make the
call and to whom she should speak; how the request might be
phrased. Team members might anticipate the range of possible re-
sponses, and might consider whether anything had to be given up as
the price of making the request; this inquiry might lead to a re-eval-
uation of the decision to ask for a postponement. The interns might
rehearse the contact with the lawyer by role playing it. After the
actual contact was made, another case team meeting might be used
to review the outcome. This retrospective review might include sig-
nificant emphasis on process, such as an examination of whether the
interns followed up any leads of the opposing counsel (such as hints
about settlement) and if so, whether they did so by design or out of
deference to the opposing counsel's greater experience. The case
team might look at which intern did the most talking during the
contact, and why, and at the emotions of the call and how they af-
fected the outcome. The advisors would raise questions that the in-
terns did not themselves identify, until the subject had been covered
thoroughly. The meeting might conclude with an intern-run evalua-
tion of what they had learned from this scrutiny of a minor
incident. 40
In Professor Lerman's example, through a "reflective learning"
process, students learned the value of planning and gained confidence
in the lawyering role and insight into their own role in professional
collaboration. In our experience, valuable lawyering skills need not
necessarily be taught in the context of a "minor event."' 41 These skills
can be taught effectively in the context of complex and factually-rich
legal problems, while at the same time increasing students' under-
satisfaction of finding it for themselves and learn how to deal effectively with complex
regulations. Id. at n.88.
38 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 36, at 303-05; Kotkin, supra note 34, at 199-200.
39 Lerman, supra note 2, at 691 [emphasis added].
40 Id. at 692 (citing Aiken et al. supra note 34, at 1054 n.33).
41 Id. The characterization of this example as a "minor event" was taken from
Lerman's article.
[Vol. 3:439
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standing of legal theory and case analysis. The fact that these complex
legal problems might arise out of an economically profitable case need
not affect the outcome.
In our program we achieved positive results by preselecting criti-
cal stages of cases for intense scrutiny by all of the students, (e.g.,
client interviewing and case evaluation, theory and theme develop-
ment, taking and defending depositions, counseling, court hearings,
various alternative dispute and negotiation opportunities, and trials).
The reflective learning process also occurred spontaneously during
case conferences and in one-on-one supervision meetings with
students.
A. Reflective Learning in Fee-for-Service Cases
Each semester, a criminal and an employment case were selected
as the focal point of two extended classes on case theory and theme.
Students were assigned preparatory readings on theory and theme de-
velopment 42 and given a short factual memorandum prepared by the
students assigned to the case chosen as the focal point of the class,
along with supporting case material. 43 After a lecture on theory and
theme formulation, theory and theme were discussed in the context of
the actual case. All of the students and supervisors raised questions,
much like medical rounds, testing the strengths and weaknesses of the
case, and suggesting areas for further investigation and refinement.44
These classes were lively and of great interest to students. An illustra-
tion of the reflective practicum in operation at Santa Clara can be
seen in the following examples.
1. An Employment Case: A Class on Theory and Theme
A typical employment case presents a unique challenge to clinical
teaching. Unlike the criminal cases, the employment cases routinely
involve numerous witnesses, the review of volumes of documents, and
they often take several semesters to complete. As a result, the em-
ployment cases do not offer students the same ready opportunity for
independence in case-planning and execution as the criminal cases.
This is central to the criticism that complex cases do not permit reflec-
42 We typically assigned one of the following: Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Develop-
ment of Professional Judgment in Law School Litigation Courses: The Concepts of Trial
Theory and Theme, 39 VAND. L. REV. 59 (1986); DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACICE, (R.L.
Carlson & E.J. Imwinkelreid 2d ed. 1995).
43 For example, in criminal cases, students were routinely given a copy of the police
report and a summary of witness statements.
44 Tentative themes are offered, critiqued, and refined. The class is videotaped for later
review by the student who will prepare the theme and theory memorandum and students
who are later assigned to the case.
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tive learning. Mindful of these differences, in the employment cases
we adopted a more collaborative model and a more directive supervi-
sion style in the early stages of the student's experience. We antici-
pated that absent sufficient direction, students would become
overwhelmed by the cases' complexity. 45 In structuring the supervi-
sion of the employment cases, we adjusted our methodology to ac-
commodate this concern.46
At the beginning of each semester, in addition to training on in-
terviewing and counseling, we gave a lecture covering the basic sub-
stantive and procedural law applicable to employment and
employment discrimination cases.47 Following an initial client inter-
view,48 students prepared a memorandum detailing the facts learned,
possible causes of action, and ideas for additional investigation. Dur-
ing a meeting of the students and supervisor to review the memoran-
dum, students were queried about their tentative theory of the case,
possible legal issues, and factual strengths and weaknesses of the case.
A decision was then made to accept or reject the case, or to conduct
further legal research or factual investigation.49
45 This tendency for students to become overwhelmed in the earliest stages of role as-
sumption is noted by Peter Toll Hoffman, supra note 36, at 303.
46 We decided to handle no more than four active employment cases at any time. We
felt that a greater caseload would reduce available supervision time to unacceptable levels
and place an unnecessary strain on financial resources. Our litigation was funded by mon-
ies generated from early settlements of cases and by arranging co-counseling agreements
with alumnae who sought clinic help on cases. This method of funding is only marginally
acceptable. The law school should be willing to provide monies for a start-up litigation
fund. An investment-of $25,000 would be sufficient for this purpose, and easily can be
repaid within ,the first eighteen months of .the clinic operation. Faculty in our combined
clinic also teach classes in the regular curriculum (criminal law and evidence). If clinic
faculty had no additional teaching load, and if fellows were added to the program, as we
will advocate later in this article, the number of active cases could be increased.
47 During the first semester of the program, before we had a full caseload, all students
were assigned intake functions during their regularly scheduled office hours. A form was
developed to aid students in covering relevant topic areas in an initial telephone screening
of cases. Students prepared a memorandum following the initial screening which set forth
the client's problem, a brief factual narrative, and a recommendation on whether a more
extensive interview should be conducted. Within forty-eight hours of the initial screening,
the intern met with the supervisor to review the memorandum. At that point, a decision
was made to reject the case, conduct further questioning by telephone, or bring the pro-
spective client in for an in-depth interview.
48 The initial client interview in an employment termination or sexual harassment case
normally takes three hours and is handled by two students. With the consent of the client,
the interview is videotaped for later evaluation and critique.
49 In evaluating the merits of the case, interns are encouraged to look ahead towards
the likely outcome at trial or non-trial disposition, and consider a host of variables. The
variables that are considered and later discussed with the client include: whether the
causes of action are likely to survive dispositive motions; the strength of likely employer
defenses; the range of recovery, less likely mitigation and the costs of suit; whether the
target defendant is able to pay a judgment; the egregiousness of the employer conduct and
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Once a case was accepted, two additional students were assigned
as co-counsel and weekly case conference meetings were scheduled.
At the first weekly meeting, students were challenged to develop a
case plan 50 and budget. Based on that work, students assumed re-
sponsibility for conducting further research, conducting witness inter-
views, developing a "cast of characters," 51 and preparing a chronology
of events, an organizational chart, a case calendar, a methodology for
document control and retrieval, a filing system, and the first draft of a
theme and theory memorandum 52 .
In the following case example, we represented a mid-level man-
ager who had been terminated from employment after eight years
with a Silicon Valley electronics firm. He had received excellent per-
formance reviews and salary increases in each year prior to his termi-
nation. At the time of his termination, the client (then 55 years old)
was told that he was being let go for performance problems, none of
which had been documented or had been the subject of any prior dis-
cipline. The company was defending by claiming that plaintiff was
employed at-will and could be fired without a showing of just cause.
The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff had been fired for a
number of performance problems for which he had been verbally
warned.
In preparation for the class, which was attended by the client,53
its impact on damages; whether the client is sympathetic or has "jury appeal"; the psycho-
logical impact of protracted litigation on the client; whether the client's version of the facts
is corroborated; and a host of other case specific issues.
50 Generally, the students correctly identified witnesses who must be interviewed, po-
tential deponents, and the need for a chronological narrative. At this stage of the case,
however, students rarely realized the need for other early case-management tools like the
cast of characters, case calendar, document management, and theme and theory memoran-
dum. These would be suggested by the supervisor and discussed as a group.
51 The "cast of characters" is a useful tool for organizing information in one place on all
potential plaintiff and defense witnesses. It, like many of these documents, is supple-
mented and revised over the life of the case. The document includes: personnel back-
ground, employment history, position and job title with employer, events the character
witnessed or has personal knowledge of, documents in his or her possession, and antici-
pated testimony. See JANICE GOODMAN ESQ. & CHRISTOPHER BELLOW, EDS., EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING & PRACTICE § 1.03[5] (1995).
52 The theme and theory memorandum is the heart of the case. It sets forth the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, incorporating the facts initially developed through the client
interview, anticipates possible defenses, and begins the development of a narrative. This is
the unifying document that will guide future discovery strategies. Although one intern gen-
erally writes the document, its development is a collaborative event involving the entire
body of clinic students.
53 We initially conducted the theory and theme classes without the client because we
were concerned that students would feel constrained in offering criticism of the client's
behaviors on the job, raise issues of personal responsibility, or argue strenuously for the
rights of the employer. On the other hand, we felt that we lost much of our client-centered
approach by not including the client. Finally, we decided to invite the client to participate.
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the students assigned to the case met with the clinic supervisor and
isolated what they considered to be the strongest facts for the plaintiff.
At the class, the facts were listed on the blackboard:
1) his eight years of employment prior to termination;
2) his eight years of good performance reviews;
3) his annual salary increases of between eight and ten percent
(the norm was five to six percent);
4) the company's progressive discipline policy that was not fol-
lowed in his termination;
5) his retirement and stock option plan which indicated the com-
pany's commitment to a long-term relationship with him.
The dialectical portion of the class began by reviewing the jury
instructions for the five causes of action raised in the case.54 After
some initial discussion, one of the theories of recovery was easily re-
jected because of problems with proof. We then asked students to as-
sume the role of jurors in the case and tell us what facts they needed
to know to decide the case on the remaining theories.








Why did [client] think he had an implied
contract [that he would not be terminated
except upon just cause]? I've worked in the
electronics industry and they always tell you
that you're "at-will" in your employment letter.
What do you mean? An employer can't just
fire you for no reason. Employees have rights.
Well what about downsizing? Don't people lose
their jobs all the time?
If the company has financial problems, they
have a right to let people go.
Under the law is it presumed that people have
lifetime employment?
What's wrong with a new manager coming in
and firing the old management team?
Shouldn't he have a right to work with people
he believes in?
The results were uniformly positive. We found little constraint in student discussion and
critique, added richness to the dialectic, and an increased rapport between the client and
students.
54 The causes of action were: breach of an express contract, breach of an implied con-
tract, breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, age discrimination, and wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
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No. I don't believe that. Employees should
have rights too.
In California there is a statute that says
employment is presumed to be "at will."
So is that the law?
No, it's a rebuttable presumption. Under cer-
tain facts, the employee could have implied
contract.
Do we know whether [client] had an employ-
ment letter? What did it say?
He did have a letter, but it was silent on the
issue of how a termination could occur.
What does the job manual say?
The manual says all employees are "at will"
unless someone at the level of a Vice-President
or President says otherwise and then it must be
stated in writing.
Well that's it, isn't it? He didn't have a letter
that said he wasn't an "at will" employee, did
he?
Is that it? What's the law on the issue?
That's what I don't understand. They talk
about an "implied term" arising from the
conduct of the parties ... what does that
mean?
What do you think it means?
I don't know. What about the parol evidence
rule?
We did a memo on that issue in another class.
The law in California is that what parties do is
just as important as what they say in writing
and might even override what's written.
When can party conduct override a writing like
the "at will" language in the manual?
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Student #4: Well, if it occurs after the fact, it might be a
contract modification, or if the language is
ambiguous.., and I think the manual is
ambiguous because it also talks about needing
to give oral and written warnings prior to






I thought the parol evidence rule meant that no
contrary evidence could come in if the agree-
ment was in writing.
You have to'have an agreement first. What was
the agreement?
How do you think the courts will decide if
there was an integrated agreement and what
the agreement was?
Well, let's start by looking at the cases.






[to client] I'm still wondering why you thought
you had a contract.
Ok, well ... I was told when I was hired that the
company was growing and that I had a great
future with them, and that they wanted me to
come and grow with the company. Every time
I got a raise, my boss would say the same kinds
of things ... you know, good job, keep it up,
let's 'do the same thing next year ... and well,
we all knew that we couldn't just fire someone
without documentation . . . Human Resources
was really adamant about that.
Did you have a contract at your last job?
Yes, I thought I did. I had a secure job there -
I only left because [defendant] was a bigger
company. I would have more responsibility,
more money, and an opportunity to move up in
the company.
Did [defendant] know that was what you
expected?
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Yes, the person who recruited me to [defen-
dant] was my old boss. I knew him to be fair
... when I got hired at [defendant], my new
boss also stressed that as long as I did a good
job, I had nothing to worryabout ... I'd
always have a job.
Did you ever have to fire anyone?
Yes.
How did it happen?
Well, it was an on-the-spot firing. The employ-
ees were fighting on the job and there's an
exception in the policy for that kind of behav-
ior.
Is that covered in the manual ... let's look,
yes, there it is. Did you ever think about firing
anyone else?
Yes, our former purchasing manager was laid
off because my boss wanted to get rid of him,
but we couldn't justify it under the terms of the
employee manual. He was an older guy, and
Human Resources was worried that he'd file an
age discrimination charge.
Tell us more about what happened in that case
This discussion was continued in case team meetings and sessions
held in preparation for drafting. discovery requests and deposition
questions. It led to a review of relevant cases and a refined case the-
ory supporting the client's reasonable basis for believing he had an
implied employment contract. It also led to the identification of new
witnesses and reinterviews of other witnesses to develop corrobora-
tion of the client's story. This approach provided students with a
model for analyzing legal abstractions and contextualizing them to de-
velop a simple factual story that was believable and coherent. Stu-
dents were then able to identify gaps in the story, pinpoint areas of
vulnerability, and develop ideas for further investigation and discov-
ery to overcome possible defenses. The progression also offered a de-
parture point for assigned students to begin planning depositions for
opposing witnesses. Finally, we were able to discuss, at length, stu-
dents' attitudinal biases about employee interests in job security and
employer rights, how those biases might be reflected in the jury pool
or by the judge, and how we might structure voir dire questions at trial
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to select a favorable jury.
In these classes, we combined directive teaching (lecture) and
nondirective teaching (students themselves developed the theory and
theme in a particular case with coaching by the teacher). We found
these classes produced a fertile environment in which students could
explore and apply a particular skills theory, i.e. they actively engaged
in legal and factual analysis.55 Further, students took part in framing a
model for problem-solving that they can recreate in their own
practices.
An example more closely analogous to that of Professor
Lerman 56 occurred during the drafting of paper discovery and the
"meet and confer" 57 process. When drafting document inspection de-
mands, the students looked backward to the theory and theme already
developed, and forward to anticipate objections to discovery de-
mands. They prepared memoranda justifying the relevance and cost-
benefits of the requested discovery in advance of receiving objections.
Once objections had been filed, interns evaluated the objections, pre-
pared responses, anticipated rebuttal, and role-played the anticipated
dialogue with opposing counsel. Thereafter, the students and supervi-
sor participated as co-counsel in the actual "meet and confer" confer-
ence. After the conference, students summarized what occurred and
recommended a course of action. The "meet and confer" was then
subjected to a thorough post-mortem in which the roles of opposing
counsel, supervisor, and interns were subjected to intense scrutiny.
The post-mortem was also utilized to reflect on the negotiating style of
our opponent, discuss any unexpected arguments raised by opposing
counsel, evaluate the merits of the arguments, fashion responses, and
attempt to predict the likely outcome before a discovery commis-
sioner if we were unable to resolve the dispute. This process, like that
of Professor Lerman, underscores the importance of planning, permits
analysis of professional role, and demystifies the discovery process,
reducing anxiety as students adjust to their new roles. It achieves
these benefits in a supportive atmosphere for the student, while ensur-
ing excellence in representation for the client.
The theme and theory class and the on-going development of
55 This collaborative learning environment is an example of what Frank S. Bloch has
called "a spirit of mutuality between teachers and students as joint inquirers." Bloch,
supra note 20, at 338, (citing MALCOLM KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT
EDUCATION 41 (1970)).
56 See supra text accompanying note 40.
57 In California, prior to the filing of any motion to compel discovery the parties are
required to make a good faith effort to informally resolve any discovery dispute; failure to
do so is sanctionable conduct. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 2023(a)(9)(Deering 1995). This require-
ment is known colloquially as the "meet and confer" obligation.
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case theory that occurs naturally in the preparatory stages of litigation
can be instrumental in the reflective practicum in a variety of ways.
The continuous dialogue between students and supervisors constitute
"reflection-in-action" as students learn theory development by doing,
creating and modifying it. The ways we guided students in how to
reflect on improving their performance at theme and theory building
(i.e. "reflection on reflection-in-action") included the use of 1) focus
groups 2) settlement conferences, 3) mediation and 3) trial.
The focus group consisted of community volunteers who sat as
"jurors" while students conducted mock trials based on their own
cases. Much like the social science research conducted in connection
with jury studies58, through these focus groups, students were able to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of their case theory and theme
while receiving valuable feed-back on their performance in the mock
trial setting. In cases that actually go to trial, the same insight can be
gained through post-trial juror interviews.
In the employment case settlement conference and in mediation,
students made an elaborate presentation of their case theory aimed at
a favorable non-trial resolution of the case. In the criminal cases, less
elaborate presentations were made in plea bargaining sessions with
prosecutors but in these sessions too, students gained valuable insight
by testing the effectiveness of their preparation and analysis. Reflec-
tion on "reflection-in-action" followed each of these events when a
post-mortem meeting was held for students and supervisors to scruti-
nize the experience and evaluate what was learned.
Throughout the semester, theme and theory classes were re-
peated as dictated by the demands of particular cases and by the edu-
cational opportunities offered. The following illustration shows the
similarity of the reflection process in a non-complex, criminal misde-
meanor case. Again, the complexity of the case and the amount of
money generated had no effect on the value of the learning
experience.
2. A Criminal Misdemeanor Case: A Class on Theory and Theme
We represented a single mother of five children, ages one to
eight, who was arrested and charged with endangering the welfare of
her children. The police had responded to a nuisance call from a
sleeping neighbor who had been disturbed by her children. The police
arrived to find her small basement apartment in complete disarray.
The client, who worked the graveyard shift at a local supermarket,
58 See, e.g., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (Beth Bonora & Elissa Krauss eds.,
2d ed. 1996).
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had been ill for several days and unable to clean the apartment. The
landlord had also failed to fix the toilet, a situation which ,resulted in
unsanitary conditions. Additionally, there were loose electrical cords,
food and debris strewn across the floor, and recycling bins strewn near
the front door.






















Where do we start?
With the jury instructions.
are read)
Those sound a lot better than the case law.
(To team members) Given these instructions,
what do you see as the strengths of your case?
She's a hard worker.
She's a nice person, very articulate.
She's not on welfare ... she's just poor.
The children are all healthy.
They're all smart. The kids are honor students.
What are the weaknesses?
The place was a real dump. The pictures are
appalling.
What else?
Yeah, she's not married, and she's having lots
of kids. Aren't jurors going to resent people
like her?
Maybe, but she's not on AFDC. Will that cut
some of the resentment?
Why didn't she marry the father? What about
him, doesn't he have some responsibility here?
He's married to somebody else. He offered to
get a divorce, but she [client] is a strict Catholic
and doesn't believe in divorce. She also doesn't
believe in birth control. The father was charged
- he pled guilty and got probation.
What has the D.A. offered her?
Theyoffered her probation.
That's not a bad offer.
But, what other implications do we need to be
concerned about if she takes probation?
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Could the state take her kids?
That's a real threat.
But, if she loses at trial she might go to jail and
then she'd lose her kids for sure.
The irony is that she temporarily lost custody of
a couple of the kids right after her arrest.
Before she could get them back one of the kids
was physically abused in foster care. All
because she's a messy housekeeper.
Do you think all of that is relevant evidence? Is
it admissible?
If I were the D.A., I'd argue it's irrelevant to
the charges and fight to keep it out. I agree it's
very good defense evidence, but we need to
articulate a good argument for its admissibility.
But do we think a jury can overcome their
aversion to what those photos show about the
condition of the house?
Well, there are lots of people who work hard
and have lots of kids and still keep their homes
clean.
So what does that tell us about the story we
want to tell about how this happened?
Well, we want to make it seem like this isn't
the norm. That it's not always like this.
How do we do that?
Well, she was sick. She was only getting two or
three hours of sleep a night because her
babysitter had cut back on her hours.
This is a very small, cramped space. It doesn't
take too long to get messy.
All that mess? It takes awhile.
No it doesn't. This was the most active time of
the day for them. She was sick. Did you ever
see the movie "Home Alone?"
Are there any photos we could use where the
house is nice and clean, like a birthday party or
something?
Spring 19971


















That's a good idea ... why don't we check it
out with [client].
Why weren't the kids in school?
It was a holiday.
How much money does she make?
$25,000. But she pays $1,000 a month in
childcare.
How did she make ends meet. What about her
family, why didn't they help?
She seems to have a good relationship with her
parents. But, I think she's really embarrassed
by how she was living.
Has anything changed since [client] was
arrested?
Everything. She moved. The father has assumed
more responsibility. They've gotten some help.
Is that relevant? Will we be able to introduce
it? Think about it. What else do you want to
know?
Did the kids have chores? What role did her
church play in her life.
Those are good questions. What else?
What did she do to try to fix the problems,
couldn't she withhold rent given the conditions?
She wasn't paying the rent. The father of the
kids knew the landlord and had something
worked out with him. She didn't really feel like
she had much control.
The landlord will testify for her... the pipe
was broken to the toilet. To fix it he needed a
loan because the floors had to be torn up and
the pipe replaced. She was using a camp toilet
and taking it out to a municipal spot and
dumping it every day. The one year old was
potty-training.
Even though the client may be technically
guilty, is she morally guilty? Would a jury
convict this woman?
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Student #5: Well, the kids were not physically hurt. They
weren't emotionally hurt .... What's the
penalty? Will she lose her kids?
(The discussion continued, developing the client's story of what









So who do we think we want as jurors?
If I were a parent, I could only sympathize to a
point. I'd stop feeling sorry for the mom and
start feeling sorry for the kids. How do we
screen out people who keep a very clean house
and can't understand anyone who doesn't?
Would people with multiple kids be more
sympathetic?
I think people with busy lifestyles in general.
I'm just a law student, but I'm exhausted at the
end of the day. When I think of all the things
she had going on ....
What about women in general? Would they be
less sympathetic to another woman?
Can any of you stand up right now and try an
opening statement putting the client in the best
possible light?
She had five kids at home, ages two to eight
... she's a hardworking person, a good mother
... there was plenty of time to turn the house
upside down.
I think we should get the focus off the dirty
house and onto our client. This is about a mom
who loved her kids ....
Through this exercise, students were challenged to examine their
own values from the perspective of a client who inhabits a very differ-
ent world, with different values and limited options. Students began
to recognize the complexity and uncertainties of trial work. They
learned the importance of humanizing the client and conveying the
client's story in a way that would most persuasively reach the jury. In
this process, they also confronted the very real problems of predicting
how a client's story would be filtered through the individual juror's
own attitudes and life experience.
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3. Other Methods of Reflective Learning in a Fee-for-Service Clinic
Through this process of theory and theme development in crimi-
nal and employment cases, students acted as both lawyer and co-coun-
sel. They received the benefit of a collaborative "brain-storming
session" involving other students and both supervisors. In the crimi-
nal case, the student assumed the primary role of legal representative
throughout the litigation. In the employment case, representation was
a collaborative effort between students and the supervisor.
A format similar to that used in the theory and theme class was
used to prepare for taking and defending depositions, evidentiary
hearings in criminal cases, settlement and mediation conferences, and
trial preparation. On occasion, we included student simulation and su-
pervisor demonstration.
For the criminal cases, all written work was prepared by students
in successive drafts until a final draft was ready. In the same way,
students in the employment case prepared all written work including
the complaint, discovery, and motions.5 9 Although this process was
lengthy and often inefficient, it posed no threat to client service. Since
caseloads were kept manageable, the turnaround time for work prod-
uct equalled or bettered that achieved by large firms.
In both criminal and employment cases students prepare and ar-
gue motions,60 and represent the client at trial. In the criminal cases,
students take sole responsibility during all pretrial motions and the
trial itself. Although the employment cases handled by the Law Clinic
have, to date, all reached settlement before trial, had any of the cases.
gone to trial the supervisor would have taken a more active role. The
students would, however, have been expected to handle most of the
representation. This arrangement is similar to the way in which re-
sponsibility is allocated in depositions. For example, the supervisor
59 'Ipically, teams of two students were assigned to draft document inspection de-
mands, requests for admissions, and special interrogatories. Before students began work
on a document a supervisory meeting was held during which students presented tentative
ideas and were encouraged to exercise initiative and creativity in their first draft. Rarely
had the student thought to tap the client as a source of inspiration and direction. This
course of action was suggested by the supervisor and the next meeting was generally more
fruitful. After a collaborative review, the intern was usually given sample pleadings. At
the next meeting, the supervisor critiqued the product, challenging the student to look
ahead to demurrers, objections, and motions to compel. The supervisor made editorial
changes, but rarely "authored" any pleading. A similar methodology was followed when
students responded to written discovery demands by opposing counsel.
60 In the employment cases, motions to compel served as an invaluable learning tool
because interns were forced to revisit their theory of the case, analyze concepts of rele-
vance, privilege, and privacy, and engage in a cost-benefit analysis. Contacts with opposing.
counsel often first occurred at this stage. Students and supervisor shared in these ex-
changes collaboratively although, depending on logistics or subject matter, the intern or
supervisor at times acted alone.
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routinely defends the client deposition,61 while students conduct depo-
sitions of other witnesses under direct supervision. Generally, this al-
lows each student to conduct at least one deposition lasting between
one and two full days. 62 Although interns do not represent the client
at the deposition, they do collaborate with the supervisor in preparing
the client. Preparation usually takes three or four days and consists of
the review of pleadings, document review, a theory discussion with the
client, and a simulated deposition.63
V. STUDENT REPRESENTATION IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
One of the most difficult questions we asked ourselves initially
was whether students could effectively represent clients in matters as
complex as employment termination cases. Employment cases de-
mand a firm grasp of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the evidence code,
the state and federal substantive law and discovery practice, and often
the integration of a complicated fact pattern. These cases are vigor-
ously defended and mistakes made or excellence achieved during the
discovery stages is usually case determinative. The practitioner must
very quickly familiarize herself with the industry practices, standards,
and terms of art of the employer in order to evaluate and attack the
claims of poor employee performance usually raised in justification of
the termination. Success often hinges on informed and skilled ques-
tioning of adverse deponents. Depositions may be emotionally
charged, implicating sexual or financial privacy issues, issues of client
self-esteem, and charges of intentional misconduct by the employer.
:From the outset, we were concerned that students be given the
greatest learning opportunity possible without compromising the rep-
61 Typically, the client deposition was conducted over a number of days, usually be-
tween three and seven. The client's supervisor's deposition was also lengthy, consuming
three orfour days. Other depositions were narrower in scope and thus more manageable.
62 It is the senior associate who conducted the deposition during the second semester of
his or her clinical experience. By that time the student had become comfortable with the
attorney role, had a thorough knowledge of the case, had usually had a court appearance in
a criminal case, and had observed a deposition. On occasion, two students conducted a
deposition as a team, dividing up areas of examination. At intern conducted depositions,
the supervisor provided feedback during breaks and gave a lengthy post-mortem. Rarely
did the supervisor intervene - never unless the quality of client service was likely to be
impaired absent intervention. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
63 Students collaborated in all stages of client preparation and often acted as opposing
counsel during the simulation. This offered them and the client an opportunity to develop
a defense perspective on the case, thereby sharpening theory development. The simula-
tions were videotaped and viewed by client, student, and supervisor. This allowed the client
an opportunity to improve and provided an excellent opportunity for evaluation and cri-
tique of student performance. Similar preparation preceded the intern conducted deposi-
tions, including client involvement and a simulation in which either the supervisor or client
assumed the witness role.
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resentation to which the client is entitled. Whether and when to inter-
vene in student representation are issues with which we struggled
throughout the life of the project. How to strike the delicate balance
between promoting the professional growth of the student while pro-
viding competent representation to the clinic client remains a crucial
ethical issue.64
There is evidence in the literature that suggests that the tension
between the clinicians' "educational obligations to students and their
professional obligations to clients" 65 is universally felt. Some clinicians
have advocated non-intervention "except in the rare instance of immi-
nent error that would seriously damage a client." 66 Others believe
that it is not sufficient simply to avoid malpractice because the client
rightfully has an interest in "avoiding anxieties and demands caused
by student mistakes and delays. ' 67 A recent study of clinicians sug-
gests that although most of those surveyed endorsed non-directiveness
in supervision, 74% also believed that the client should receive "the
best possible legal service. '68 Understandably, the authors of the
study found it difficult to reconcile these views about client service
with the commitment to non-directive supervision also espoused by
most respondents.69 They suggest that the balance must be struck in
favor of meeting the educational needs of the student and that clini-
cians should frankly admit that while "highly competent, even excel-
lent service [can be provided], the best possible [service]" need not be
provided. 70
Mere avoidance of malpractice should not be a standard that we,
as clinicians, endorse. Such a standard falls short of the level of pro-
fessionalism we should expect of our students and ourselves. At the
same time, student error endangering the clinic client's interest in ex-
cellent service is not uncommon. Therefore, throughout the life of
our project, we monitored the educational needs of our students and
the quality of service to our clients.
The admitted dangers inherent in student handling of employ-
ment cases were avoided by "assigning students manageable portions
of complex cases that are challenging but still within the law student's
64 This issue has not be satisfactorily explored in clinical scholarship. One author who
has explored this issue suggested criteria for intervention when the student performance
poses an unacceptable risk to the client. See George Critchlow, Professional Responsibil-
ity, Student Practice and the Clinical Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 415
(1991).
65 James H. Stark et al., Directiveness In Clinical Supervision, 3 PUB. INT. L.J. 35 (1993).
66 Aiken et al., supra note 34, at 1073.
67 Critchlow, supra note 64, at 428.
68 Stark et al., supra note 65, at 45.
69 Id.
70 Id at 67.
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capabilities."'7 1 By working collaboratively with experienced practi-
tioners, (both clinic supervisors and co-counsel), students were given
an invaluable opportunity to learn through "reflection-in-action" and
modeling. We found the employment cases to be particularly suitable
for a law clinic, "because they foster genuine mutual inquiry between
the student and the teacher. 72
VI. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE BAR
In conceptualizing our program, we were concerned that a fee-
generating law clinic would be seen by members of the private bar,
especially our alumnae, as unfair competition. This concern has been
articulated as a critique of the fee-generating model:
One potentially harmful consequence of the fee-for-service
structure ... might be resentment from private practitioners who
have to pay bills to support all the services that the law school clini-
cians receive without cost. These services include not only Lexis,
Westlaw, and library research services, but also rent, utilities, sala-
ries for administrative support staff, law clerk wages, and other ad-
ministrative costs .... In essence the clinicians might be viewed as
having unfair advantages in competing for client business. 73
Concern that we not alienate members of the local bar prompted
us to conduct an informal survey of several members of the plaintiffs'
and defense bar, including alumnae, who handled employment cases.
Those with whom we spoke were unanimously enthusiastic about our
proposed project. The consensus was that even in the relatively small
marketplace of Santa Clara County (where our cases would be tried),
there are too few attorneys representing plaintiffs in employment
cases. 74 Throughout the life of the project, we worked cooperatively
71 Id. at 353.
72 Bloch, supra note 20, at 352.
73 Lerman, supra note 2, at 705.
74 Because employment litigation has grown so quickly in recent years, it remains an
area underserved by the private bar. This is due in part to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which expanded the legal relief available to plaintiffs and granted a right to trial by jury.
Other factors probably at play are the difficulty in proving intentional discrimination
and the costs of pretrial preparation. Proof problems are less onerous in California than
many other jurisdictions because it is often possible to plead alternative causes of action
sounding in contract. Contract claims do not, however, allow for recovery of hedonic and
punitive damages. A typical employment case costs between $10,000-20,000 to litigate. It is
not unusual to depose between five and ten witnesses, some over multiple days. Addi-
tional costs may also include a forensic economic expert, a psychologist or psychiatrist, a
labor or human resources expert and an investigator. Employment cases are labor inten-
sive. It is not unusual to log in excess of 250 hours of attorney time in the preparatory
stages. As a result, even one or two of these cases can quickly take over all of the available
time for a small practitioner. Since these cases take between 12-18 months to bring to trial,
a small practitioner can face financial ruin before realizing a profit.
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with local counsel and routinely received referrals from them, eventu-
ally co-counseling two cases with alumnae.
Among the clients represented at Santa Clara's fee-for-service
clinic were mid-level managers, teachers, and waitresses and issues in-
cluded wrongful termination and sexual harassment. In some of the
cases we accepted, the client had been rejected by or was unable to
afford private counsel. 75 In other cases, private counsel came to the
clinic rather than bear the cost of representation alone. Rather than
resentment from the private bar, we received support and encourage-
ment for our project.
VII. CASE SELECTION
A. Profit v. Pedagogy
One major criticism of the fee-for-service model is that cases may
be selected on a profit, rather than a pedagogical, basis. 76 In our ex-
perience at Santa Clara, this apprehension was unfounded. Although
some cases were rejected because they were not economically via-
ble, 77 there were ample cases available that were both economically
and educationally sound. Moreover, within the design of our program
we had the added advantage of providing our students the opportu-
nity to represent clients in both criminal misdemeanor and employ-
ment cases. The diversity of this practice exposed our students to two
very different, yet complementary, practice models. They undertook
representation of a diverse clientele, became familiar with different
discovery models, experimented with different roles, and benefitted
from a variety of teaching methodologies. The fact that our employ-
ment cases generated considerable fees in no way detracted from the
educational results we achieved.
The threat to the educational mission comes not from selecting
cases which are fee-generating for use in clinical teaching, but from
mandating that the clinician bear complete responsibility for generat-
ing her salary and overhead costs. This demand, coupled with the type
of financial bonus incentive the clinician at Chicago-Kent receives if
successful, raises a distinct danger that clinicians will assume a larger
75 Many of the plaintiffs' bar are unwilling to accept these cases on a purely contingent
fee basis because of the time and cost involved in preparation and the financial risk of an
unfavorable result.
76 Lerman, supra note 2, at 698-99.
77 For instance, a client may have an appealing case on liability but may have com-
pletely mitigated damages by obtaining a comparable, or superior, position. Rarely should
an action be brought if there is no wage loss because jurors are reluctant to award compen-
satory or punitive damages in the absence of economic harm to the plaintiff unless the
employer conduct was outrageous. An obvious exception can be found in sexual harass-
ment claims, in which the outrage of the jury can translate into a significant award.
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caseload than can be reasonably handled in the setting of a reflective
practicum. Where salaries are in no way dependent on fees gener-
ated, there is little danger that cases will be selected for their potential
profit rather than their educational value.
B. Profit v. Public Interest
The concern that generating profit might pose a threat to the pub-
lic interest mission of clinical educators is not only untrue but at Santa
Clara we found exactly the opposite. With the profit we earned we
were actually able to enhance the public interest work of this
program.
Prior to the start of our experimental fee-generating program,
Santa Clara Law Clinic generated some income - on average $6,000
a year - primarily through its criminal cases. The clinic customarily
charged from $150 to $300 per case. Although the clinic occasionally
represented clients free of charge, mosts clients who could not afford
our services received representation from the Public Defender's of-
fice. The fees we generated covered litigation costs (e.g. investigation,
filing fees, copying, and discovery) and allowed us to make a minimal
contribution to the University. In the first year of our experiminental
program, we received over $66,00078 in fees from the employment
cases. With the added income, we accepted more criminal cases on a
pro bono basis than we had in the past because we were able to ab-
sorb the litigation costs of criminal clients who could not otherwise
afford even our normal, nominal fee.79
As a direct result of the substantial fees earned, we have also ad-
ded a supervisor to our clinical staff. This fellow8° has allowed us to
expand our program by increasing our enrollment by 50%. We are
now providing clinical opportunities to more students, and accepting a
correspondingly greater number of cases. Traditionally, Santa Clara
Law Clinic's public interest work included representing people with
AIDS, battered women, and indigent criminal defendants. With addi-
tional staffing, we have been able to increase representation in these
cases and enhance our public interest program. Consistent with our
public interest mission, our fellowship program is specifically designed
to provide financial and peer support for law graduates traditionally
underrepresented in law teaching.
78 In actuality, we earned more than $66,000 in that first year. Because of the lag time
between accepting a case and final resolution, we did not receive income on some of those
early cases until more than a year later.
79 Supra note 2.
80 Supra note 16.
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VIII. THE STATUS OF CLINICIANS
In his article critiquing the Chicago-Kent model, Marty Guggen-
heim warns that a fee-generating clinic that requires clinical faculty to
raise their own salaries creates a dangerous and unacceptable "double
standard." This double standard brands the clinician as an expenda-
ble "outsider" who is not truly valued by the academy.81 To illustrate
this point, Guggenheim writes of the absurdity of requiring a constitu-
tional law scholar to raise her own salary as a condition of employ-
ment.82 Lisa Lerman echoes this concern and also postulates that the
Chicago-Kent model will negatively affect the ability of clinicians to
produce scholarly work, develop teaching materials, or engage in
other professional activities. Her concern is that the clinician will be
hampered by the need to generate billable hours during the summer
months to meet her financial obligation.83 We agree that these are
serious concerns. As any clinician knows, it is very difficult to find
time to supervise students effectively, manage a caseload, participate
in law school governance, and produce scholarship. Many clinicians
leave lucrative private practices and come to work in a university set-
ting precisely because they want the opportunity to engage in scholar-
ship. Any model which impedes clinical scholarship poses the danger
that clinical teachers and the clinical enterprise will be marginalized.
It is because of these concerns that we agree with critics who ar-
gue that it is unwise to require clinicians to generate salary and over-
head as a condition of employment. Clinicians have struggled too
long and too hard in the move toward acceptance of their programs
and parity with their colleagues. The fact that one aspect of one fee-
generating model may be problematic does not mean that the benefits
of such a program should be discarded. In order to cure the deficien-
cies in legal education outlined in the MacCrate report,84 law schools
must be committed to their clinical faculty and to the educational mis-
sion of the clinical enterprise.
One way in which fees generated can preserve the status of clini-
cians is through the support of a fellow. At Santa Clara, with money
generated by our employment program we have been able to hire a
full-time fellow to assist with teaching and case supervision. This sup-
port allows the clinician time for serious study and scholarship. Fur-
ther, by supervising a clinic class over the summer, the fellow provides
continuity in case management and frees the clinician for scholarly
work. Not requiring that clinicians generate their own salaries and
81 Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 681-82.
82 Id. at 682.
83 Lerman, supra note 2, at 702-03.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 18-19.
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adding fellows to clinic staff enables the clinician to maintain her sta-
tus and the clinic to maintain the integrity of its educational mission.
IX. THE ROAD AHEAD
As anyone working in the area of legal education knows, budget-
ary problems faced by law schools today present an unprecedented
threat to clinical education. If we are going to take seriously the criti-
cisms of the MacCrate report, legal educators must turn to new ways
of supporting clinical education. As our experience at Santa Clara
proves, this can be accomplished without sacrificing pedagogical goals.
To achieve a workable balance between the professional interests
of the clinician and the benefits of fees generated by cases, we advo-
cate incorporating safeguards into a fee-generating model. In addi-
tion to not making a clinician's salary dependent on fees generated,
we recommend that mandatory caps (beneficial to both clinician and
student) be imposed on the number of cases handled by the clinician.
For example, in the context of employment termination cases, we
would advise that no more than four active cases be handled by a
single clinician at any given time.
Based on our experience, even a modest fee-for-service clinic has
the potential to produce income substantial enough to pay for most if
not all of the operating costs of that clinic. A program combining
criminal misdemeanor and employment cases85 supervised by two full-
time faculty and one fellow86 can serve 20 students each semester.87
Given a case turnaround time of 12 to 18 months from the filing of the
complaint to trial or non-trial disposition, 88 the clinic can expect to
resolve an average of three cases per year. The average employment
case settles in the range of $150,000 and $300,000.89 At a standard
contingent fee of between 33 1/3 and 40% of recovery, this means that
the clinic can estimate a recovery of fees in the range of $150,000 to
85 Although our model contemplates a clinic made up of criminal and employment
cases, the basic structure of this model could be equally successful utilizing other concen-
trations. This would, of course, depend on selecting legal areas that complement one an-
other by offering students both the independent learning experience provided by the
criminal cases and the collaborative learning opportunity provided by the employment
cases.
86 We contemplate that a fellow would have a minimum of two years experience in
practice and would be paid not more than $40,000 annually on an eleven-month contract.
87 The clinic at Santa Clara proved successful operating as a one semester program with
one or two students a semester enrolling for a second term. In the clinic we propose, all
students would enroll for two semesters.
88 This is the standard "fast track" pace of cases in Santa Clara County. It also approxi-
mates the turnaround time for civil cases in most federal courts.
89 These figures are based on settlements in employment cases in the San Francisco Bay
area as reported over a two-year period. See JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY (1994-95).
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$360,000 annually.
Assuming that the recovery falls at the low end of the range, the
fees generated would support a full-time faculty salary and benefits
with overage. If the recovery is even slightly better, at $200,000, the
salary and benefits of the fellow are also covered. Although the clini-
cian's salary is not dependent on fees generated, as it is at Chicago-
Kent, the added income would provide additional resources for the
law school by substantially defraying the costs of a clinical program
that provides an excellent experience to more students and enables
legal education to move substantially closer to meeting the goals of
the MacCrate report.
CONCLUSION
The assertion of critics that there is "an inverse relationship be-
tween the economic efficiency of legal work and its pedagogical
value" 9 is unfounded. It is possible to be true to our pedagogical
goals, maintain our status among our colleagues and the integrity of
our clinical programs, and at the same time generate money on which
the future of clinical education depends.
As anyone working in the area of legal education knows, budget-
ary problems faced by law schools today present an unprecedented
threat to clinical education. If we are going to take seriously the criti-
cisms of the MacCrate report, legal educators must turn to new ways
of supporting clinical education. As our experience at Santa Clara
proves, this can be accomplished without sacrificing our goals.
90 Lerman, supra note 2, at 691.
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